He explained that our school is a government operation, getting its money from taxpayers and its students from jurisdictional assignment. Our parents go along, because otherwise they would have to pay twice for schooling. Th e school itself is without private owners, so no one has much motivation to improve it. If schools were, instead, privately owned and had to compete for money by winning families in individual choice they would be much better. Th ose rules would give rise to a wholly diff erent industry. You and your parents would have chosen the school. Th at would alter the whole ethic of the enterprise and your involvement. Each school would have to keep its customers satisfi ed, for otherwise they would go elsewhere.
Th e explanation was a revelation. It spoke to personal experience. It spoke of a trouble that loomed large in years of despair-the malaise and alienation of school. It only made sense. Moreover, the principles had application to many other issues, such as drug prohibition. Th at conversation awakened me to the idea, the hope, of making sense of the social world in a way that did not just knuckle under to whatever interpretations were dominant and offi cial.
Th e ideas would upset my family's political sensibilities. Surely, I saw a daring, even heroic, radicalism in the ideas. I was convinced that the criticism of government schooling was sound. Yet my parents, my grandparents, and offi cialdom all around us did not own up to the criticism and its sweeping implications. Th ey did not give good counterarguments. Th e rust runs deep, and the young libertarian feels surrounded by a corrupt culture. He either keeps up the challenge or resigns and quietly submits. I kept up the challenge, along with that friend and others, forming a circle and fi nding validation from writers living and deceased, active intellectuals, and leaders of libertarian outfi ts, especially in and around New York City, and soon networks beyond. I have made a career from the mode of thinking revealed over ping pong.
Why do I relate such matters? As we go through life, we develop commitments. It is useful of authors to disclose where they come from. Gunnar Myrdal (1969) argued for self-disclosure, saying it alerts readers to the biases apt to lurk in the author's discourse. Also, the story says something about my bearings. It is not as though I went to college, took an economics course, imbibed blackboard theory, became a proud economics major, and deduced that schooling should resemble perfect competition. Rather, the ideas that our circle pursued were discursive and argumentative: Frédéric Bastiat and Henry Hazlitt. Th e ideas helped me to see schooling as a public-policy issue and to distance myself from the immediate experience. ( 27 ) Th ey proved themselves in things that mattered and made sense in human terms. Th e government school system is not merely ineffi cient; it is tragic. By the time I came to blackboard economics, I had already regarded it as dangerous in its artifi ciality and malleable to all bents.
So, blackboard economics never captivated me. I did have some immersion in a diff erent sort of modernist or proudly scientifi c economics. I have moved in libertarian circles that have had deep connections to the intellectual traditions that, especially from the 1970s, have been fashioned into a movement known as Austrian economics. Th is movement unfolded in two camps, one led by Murray N. Rothbard, the other by Israel M. Kirzner, both of whom during the 1950s were protégés of the Austrian émigré Ludwig von Mises. During the winter of 1979-80, I dropped out of high school and enrolled at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey, to join a program in Austrian economics. According to Mises, Rothbard, and, somewhat less emphatically, Kirzner, economics is based on axioms, such as "man acts," and, they say, the laws of economics are logically deduced from these axioms. Since the fundamental axioms are certain and the logic is valid, the resultant theories carry an "apodictic" and categorical truth. Th ey call this style of reasoning praxeology. Shortly after I had joined the Austrian economics program in Newark, it moved to George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, and I moved with it.
As an undergraduate at George Mason in the early 1980s, my comrades and I dwelled deeply in Mises and Rothbard, and I certainly drew much from them that remains central in my thinking. It really was not long, however, before I was doubting the things most distinctive to their economics, namely, their image of economic science. I never warmed to Mises, and I have long felt that his argumentation exhibits crankishness. Early on with me, there were grave doubts and occasional raillery.
My reverence for them was-and remains-great. More than any other single person, Mises is the bridge from classical liberalism to modern libertarianism. More than any other single person, Rothbard set out for modern libertarianism an idea of liberty as an analytic fulcrum in the policy sciences and as an engine of inquiry, challenge, and debate. I felt, however, that they were overly ambitious, sometimes even ridiculous, in the claims they made for their core ideas, in their spirit of paradigm. I sensed that it was in those claims-and only in those claims-that they could claim to have a distinctive identity and brand of economics, and so I was never very comfortable in the corresponding "Austrian economics" identity. By the end of my undergraduate career, I was increasingly dubious of such identity, and had, in a quite conscious way, a merely "libertarian economist" selfhood.
Next, I went directly to get a PhD. I had been admitted to a few programs, and I chose New York University, where I had been awarded entrance and support in the Austrian economics program conducted by the faculty members Kirzner, Mario Rizzo, and Lawrence H. White. Th e program, with its faculty, visitors, associates, and students meeting every Monday afternoon to discuss a paper in a ninety-minute colloquium, had been and still is the long-standing center of Austrian economics in New York and a legacy of Mises' instruction and seminars at NYU. I did not go to NYU to develop myself as an Austrian economist. My reasons for choosing NYU were that Austrians are libertarians, I was assured of funding, NYU was a reputable school from which to enter the academic job market, and the location was suitable to me (I moved back to Bergen County).
I think it was during my second year at NYU that the Austrian colloquium hosted Donald (now Deirdre) McCloskey to present the "Rhetoric of Economics" article that had recently appeared in Th e Journal of Economic Literature. I was immediately taken with the paper and with McCloskey as a personality, thinker, and fi gure. I waxed about the book Th e Rhetoric of Economics (1985) in a review published by the Cato Institute, and I avidly mined the pragmatist tradition that McCloskey pointed to, especially William James and Richard Rorty. Meanwhile, two of my closest comrades, then studying at Harvard, were reading W.V. Quine and auditing Hilary Putnam, so philosophical pragmatism had come to me and my pals.
McCloskey's attitude of mere ethics, of broad learning, of candid purpose behind that better-organized conversation we might call science-with a small s-of indiff erence toward strutting methodological precepts, of aversion to sectarianism: all fi t the selfhood I was working on. And he (now she) was even libertarian! It all fi t! McCloskey validated my selfhood and richly instructed and provided for its cultivation.
At NYU I participated in the Austrian colloquium and took courses with Rizzo and White, but I concentrated on "normal science" and especially game theory. My job-market paper was a game-theoretic model of credit reporting and promise keeping in the extended social order. I was fascinated by game theory, and I went on to teach it at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, but it never got in the way of my McCloskeyan attitudes. "Equilibrium" is meaningful only in reference to a specifi ed model, and model building is itself a malleable art, so one can construe equilibrium in any phenomena under the sun. Th e modelbuilding genre of creative literature has standards of elegance and, one hopes, relevance to problems discussed by concerned, purposive scholars. Th e stories were formally about machines, robots, but they can be useful as metaphors. My professors in game theory told stories laden with math; Th omas Schelling, whose works I especially admire, did it with less math and greater richness. Th anks to the Institute for Humane Studies, I spent a year at Stanford University and then went on the market and accepted a job, starting in 1989, at the University of California, Irvine. I was making eff orts in normal-science fi elds, such as game theory, economic history, and transportation economics. Th ese eff orts did not meet with complete failure. But I shared with both McCloskey and the Austrians the conviction that things were fundamentally amiss in establishment economics. I began to realize that I could never be embraced by a fi eld community; I could not really be one of them. I would never be faithful to any such community.
I was isolated at Irvine. Searching for God, as it were, I took up teaching the introductory course in microeconomic principles and started a group called the Liberty Society of Irvine. When Friedrich Hayek died in the spring of 1992, I decided that I would give a lecture on his life and work, and I immersed myself in his writings.
My thoughts dwelled on the broad verities of liberal economics per se, their formulation and content. Hayek was foremost in my thoughts, but for additional points of departure and connections to living communities, I found myself returning to the work of my NYU professor Israel Kirzner, now with more interest and fascination as well as a better living understanding of the predicament of his tradition. At Irvine I increasingly departed from normalcy.
Th e Austrian economics movement is pretty uniformly libertarian, but there is an important division within the movement. Rothbard fashioned an Austrian economics in which, as it were, Mises was the great authority and Rothbard himself his apostle and interpreter. In lucid, intrepid prose, Rothbard reduced matters of social welfare to issues of voluntarism. Each person acts to better his condition, so restricting his action reduces the welfare of him and his trading partners, and hence reduced social welfare. He made it openly formulaic and categorical, giving little ground to aberrations of human folly, externalities, and the like. Th e praxeological laws of economics are deduced, yielding a science of economics. Many libertarians fi nd Rothbard's axiomatic, formulaic approach refreshing, invigorating, and powerful. It would seem to coincide with the revelation that I experienced during the ping pong game in my friend's basement. Young libertarians naturally take to this approach and often buy into its precepts, image of science, heroes, narrative, and so on. In Rothbard's view, Hayek was an intellectual cousin, but squishy, obscure, convoluted, and too conservative; not well aligned to Mises. To Rothbard, Hayek was something of a rival. Rothbard was often vigorous in criticizing rivals. He wrote that Hayek's eminence and infl uence might derail the science of liberty. Th e other camp of Austrianism, led by Kirzner, embraced Hayek along with Mises. Th e theory and historical intellectual narrative provided by Kirzner attempt to integrate Mises and Hayek, and, in suggesting that the integration is latent in both, to homogenize Mises and Hayek. Kirzner's infl uence within the Austrian realm is huge; he has often been called the "dean" of Austrian economics. Peter Boettke has been a leader of the Kirzner camp, and his own, often-repeated way of expressing Kirzner's view is: "Th e best reading of Mises is a Hayekian one and the best reading of Hayek is a Misesian one" (quoted in Horwitz 2004: 308).
I undertook explorations under the two rubrics stated in the title of the present book: knowledge and coordination. Under the knowledge rubric, I wrote of the discovery factors of economic freedom and off ered a "deepself" refi nement of Kirzner's ideas about discovery, entrepreneurship, and error. Th e latter paper was published in Th e Review of Austrian Economics and even awarded a prize. I received warm letters about these papers from Kirzner, who also was writing recommendation letters in my behalf. By virtue of an invitation from Mario Rizzo, I contributed to a tribute on the occasion of Kirzner's retirement from NYU.
I also explored coordination. I distinguished two kinds of coordination, and I suggested that the distinction clarifi ed some of the controversies surrounding the issue of whether successful entrepreneurial action disrupts coordination, as in "creative destruction," or enhances coordination, as Kirzner maintains. I was off ering what I again thought was a useful refi nement and clarifi cation, ultimately affi rming Kirzner's drift. I was invited to give the paper at NYU. At the seminar, Kirzner took demonstrative exception to the paper. He subsequently published a piece critical of that early paper.
My papers on knowledge and coordination were, to my mind, true to Hayek and useful as they connected to Kirzner, in refi ning and clarifying some of his ideas, and qualifying some of his claims. In time, however, it grew increasingly clear to me that those alterations, even though they affi rm the importance of entrepreneurial discovery and its relation to coordination, threaten the Misesian aspects of Kirzner's doctrine, and hence his whole variety of Austrian economics. It seems to me that Kirzner grew to see that, too. He grew chillier toward my work. As the intellectual confl ict grew more apparent, the Austrians of the Kirzner camp, too, grew chillier, without, I felt, giving good reasons. I felt that they were circling the wagons. Eventually I felt impelled to write (with Jason Briggeman) a lengthy and rather fi erce critique of Kirzner, calling again for certain alterations. Kirzner replied, and I rejoined. One alteration is to weaken our claims about the coordinative properties of entrepreneurial activity, and of liberalizing reforms generally. We should not even aspire to make them categorical. Rather, they are, by and large, presumptive-and, in consequence, less brittle, more robust. Th is attitude fl ies in the face of the Misesian approach of axioms and logical deductions.
Meanwhile, I pondered why all of us of the Hayek-Kirzner traditions seemed to carry two obsessions, namely, an obsession with knowledge and an obsession with coordination. Th e connection between the two rubrics remained unclear to me. I had the feeling that the two were connected in ways not adequately understood. Th e connection I eventually found comes from Scotland, from works written more than a century before Ludwig von Mises was born.
I was growing increasingly intimate with Adam Smith's works. I came to realize that Smith's ethical approach necessarily involves an allegorical spectator representing a conception of the social, and that the moral faculties of such a spectator are inherently like aesthetics-not precise and accurate, but, to use Smith's expression, "loose, vague, and indeterminate." I had adopted such a spectatorial approach in my papers on coordination. I came to see how Smithian allegory could be further deployed to give better formulation to economic talk of market communication, social cooperation, social error and correction, and other basic ideas in economics. Under the knowledge rubric, I had worked out an understanding of the richness of the agent's knowledge, involving the agent's information, interpretations, judgment, discoveries, plans, disappointment or fulfi llment, regret or affi rmation, and error and correction. Now, we may take that understanding and apply it to the Smithian allegorical being as the agent in question. It is precisely the applying of what is developed under the knowledge rubric to the allegorical being that gives meaning and coherence to a number of key ideas under the coordination rubric. To do so the allegory would have to be further developed, openly and unabashedly. We fi nd Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, Bishop Butler, and Smith writing of virtue as cooperation with the Deity (four quotations are appended at the end of this chapter), but the formulation can work for agnostics, atheists, and secularists, too, if they understand the beholder to be allegorical, socially shared and yet under contention, a cultural legacy and a work in progress.
In confessing the Smithian approach, we confess that economics is nested within ethics and that the composite involves aesthetics. We manage to develop some rules for our ideas of the social good, but they remain rather vague, like rules that might be off ered for a good novel. Th ere is disagreement over aesthetic rules. If our ideas of the social good conformed to precise and accurate rules, there would be less disagreement. Th ey would be more like grammatical rules, about which we little disagree.
Th us, a second alteration to Kirzner is that our very notion of coordination is not precise and accurate but inherently somewhat loose, vague, and indeterminate, akin to our aesthetic sensibilities. Th is alteration, too, confl icts with the paradigmatic approach of Mises, and indeed with most any proudly scientifi c image of economic science. I am jettisoning what is really distinctive to Mises. In aligning my interpretations with Hayek, I am dehomogenizing Mises and Hayek.
I might concur with Peter Boettke that the most charitable reading of Mises is a Hayekian one. Th e most charitable reading of Hayek, however, is not a Misesian one. Arguably, the most charitable reading of both is a Smithian one. A principal aim of the present book is to give further development to the alternative centered on Smith.
All of this may seem like factional strife, but the viability of a discursive liberal economics, viability in terms of both the professional and the public cultures, would be signifi cantly enhanced if more young liberal scholars, disenchanted with establishment economics and initiated to powerful insights, circumvented Austrian strictures and pretenses and found their way to Hayek and, especially, to Smith. Th e present formulations are sensibly discursive and human; they honor, credit, and preserve what is valuable in Mises, Rothbard, and Kirzner while avoiding some of their shortcomings. Th ey strengthen our connections to the rich tradition of Smith and the original arc of liberalism.
"Heterodox" left economists often paint free-market economics as philosophically naive, as modernist or positivist. Some free-market economists are like that. More and more, though, they are like Adam Smith. I try to give expression to a character of liberal economics, an expression I hope serviceable to economists and others. Th e book expresses sensibilities highly congruent, I think, with those of Adam Smith. Th e present book, We have then a declaration, in some degree of present eff ect, from Him who is supreme in Nature, which side he is of, or what part he takes; a declaration for virtue, and against vice. So far therefore as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and the right of the case, in whatever he is concerned; so far he is on the side of the divine administration, and co-operates with it: and from hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and implicit hope of somewhat further. Th e happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them into existence. No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine benignity which we necessarily ascribe to him; and this opinion, which we are led to by the abstract consideration of his infi nite perfections, is still more confi rmed by the examination of the works of nature, which seem all intended to promote happiness, and to guard against misery. But by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most eff ectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence.
(TMS: 166)
